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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court decided recently in Graham v. Florida that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentence of life in prison without parole 
for a nonhomicide crime committed by a minor.  In its decision, the 
Court stated that “[t]he concept of proportionality is central to the 
Eighth Amendment”1 and that it is the “precept of justice that pun-
ishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] of-
fense.”2  What about proportionality makes it a matter of justice?  And 
how does proportionality cohere with our constitutional values?  This 
Article addresses these questions. 
 
† Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. 
1 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010). 
2 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 
(1910)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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I.  WHY PROPORTIONALITY? 
Why does proportionality matter for the Constitution?  The prin-
ciple of proportionality is commonly associated with the retributivist—
or just deserts—theory of punishment, or the idea that people should 
receive the punishment that they deserve and no more.3  However, 
simply saying that some people deserve to be punished does not ex-
plain why the State must be the one to mete out the punishment peo-
ple deserve.  As a general matter, the State is not in the business of 
ensuring just deserts.  Bad things may happen to good people, just as 
some people may achieve far more success than they deserve.  But it is 
not the State’s job to intervene and take from those who have more 
than they deserve and give to those who have less.4  We need to move 
beyond the simple assertion that some people deserve certain things 
when attempting to justify the State’s role in doling out punishment.  
To make some headway into the question of why proportionality 
matters, we must first explore the rationales for criminal law.  I high-
light two in particular here.  First, criminal law plays an important role 
in preserving physical security through its system of prohibitions and 
punishments.5  That is, harm reduction is an important goal of crimi-
nal law.  Second, criminal law functions to displace feelings of resent-
ment and desires for personal vengeance by punishing wrongdoing.6  
As John Gardner put it, “The blood feud, the vendetta, the duel, the 
revenge, the lynching:  for the elimination of these modes of retalia-
tion, more than anything else, the criminal law as we know it today 
came into existence.”7   
These two aspects of criminal law explain several key features of 
our criminal justice system, namely that it is coercive, judgmental, and 
 
3 See ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING:  
EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 1 (2005) (treating the terms “proportionate” and “deserved” 
interchangeably in the punishment context); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 
(2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Proportionality—the notion that the 
punishment should fit the crime—is inherently a concept tied to the penological goal of 
retribution.”). 
4 See David Dolinko, Some Thoughts About Retributivism, 101 ETHICS 537, 542 (1991) 
(“After all, the government, state, or ‘society’ does not automatically take it upon itself 
to give people what they deserve in other respects.”). 
5 See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 3-6 (2001). 
6 See, e.g., JOHN GARDNER, OFFENCES AND DEFENCES:  SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 213 (2007) (“The justifiability of criminal punishment, and 
criminal law in general, is closely connected to the unjustifiability of our retaliating 
against those who wrong us.”). 
7 Id. at 213. 
Lee FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  5/5/2012 12:53 AM 
2012] Why Proportionality Matters 1837 
preemptive.  First, its coercive aspect reveals itself most dramatically and 
obviously through the process of apprehending and punishing offend-
ers.  The coercive aspect is essential for ensuring order and physical 
security—a key function of criminal law.8   
Second, the criminal justice system is judgmental in the sense that 
when we punish, we also blame, condemn, and stigmatize the offend-
ers.9  By stigmatizing offenders, punishment gets “personal” and sends 
the message that their acts reflect badly on them.10  This judgmental 
aspect derives at least partially from the displacement function of crim-
inal law.  A core purpose of criminal law and punishment is to manage 
the punitive and retaliatory emotions of those who have been victims of 
wrongdoers (as well as others in the community who feel indirectly vic-
timized)11 and to sublimate, displace, and provide an outlet for feelings 
of resentment toward the wrongdoers.  The success or failure of a so-
ciety’s criminal law system thus depends on how well it responds to the 
punitive emotions of its citizens.12 
Finally, the criminal justice system is preemptive in that the State is the 
exclusive agent licensed to punish criminal wrongdoing.13  Although the 
basic idea of retribution—that people should receive what they de-
serve—appears facially neutral on the question of who should be the one 
 
8 See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 3, at 21-27 (describing how “hard treat-
ment” prevents future crimes and harms). 
9 See JOEL FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING:  ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 
100 (1970) (noting the tendency of punishment to express both society’s “strong disap-
proval of what the criminal did” and a “kind of vindictive resentment” toward the crim-
inal). 
10 See VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 48 (2005) (“The imposition of 
criminal responsibility, at least within the range of relatively serious offences, necessarily 
involves moral criticism of the defendant as a person.”); John Gardner, On the General 
Part of the Criminal Law (“The criminal law gets personal.  To be convicted of a crime is 
to be criticised, or even sometimes condemned, as a person.”), in PHILOSOPHY AND THE 
CRIMINAL LAW:  PRINCIPLE AND CRITIQUE 205, 236 (Antony Duff ed., 1998). 
11 See S.E. Marshall & R.A. Duff, Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs, 11 CANADIAN 
J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 7, 20 (1998) (“A group can . . . ‘share’ the wrongs done to its 
individual members . . . . Wrongs done to individual members of the community are 
then wrongs against the whole community—injuries to a common or shared, not merely 
to an individual, good.”). 
12 See GARDNER, supra note 6, at 216 (“[T]he criminal law’s medicine must be strong 
enough to control the toxins of bitterness and resentment which course through the 
veins of those who are wronged, or else the urge to retaliate in kind will persist un-
checked.”). 
13 See Alon Harel, Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions:  The Case Against 
Privately Inflicted Sanctions, 14 LEGAL THEORY 113, 115 (2008) (“To the extent that the 
state prohibits certain sorts of conduct, it is the state and the state alone that ought to 
administer sanctions for the violations of these prohibitions.”). 
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giving wrongdoers what they deserve, the government is the only legiti-
mate punisher, and the law prohibits private individuals from taking the 
law into their own hands.14  This preemptive aspect is essential to both 
the harm prevention and the displacement functions of criminal law. 
How does all this relate to our Constitution’s requirement of pro-
portionality?  We cannot understand the various substantive and pro-
cedural safeguards rooted in our criminal justice system without 
reference to the overarching role that criminal law plays in our society.  
The government enjoys an enormous amount of power, not only to 
interfere forcefully with people’s lives and to brand individuals with 
the stigma of blameworthiness, but also to prohibit others from doing 
the same.  In order for the government to maintain its status as the 
exclusive legitimate wielder of this power, it must use its force in cer-
tain specified ways. 
That is, the displacement function begets the judgmental aspect of 
punishment, and as the State metes out this punishment and blame, it 
must do so under the constraints of fairness.  To achieve fairness, the 
State must punish in a manner that is consistent with principles of 
proportionality:  it must treat its citizens equally.15  To be more precise, 
proportionality principles ensure that the State treats the equals equally 
and the unequals unequally. 
The fundamental legal protection that people be punished no 
more than they deserve is thus a requirement that flows neither from 
the laws of morality nor from some general principle that people 
ought to receive only what they deserve.  Rather, it is one of many 
conditions that attach to the government’s exclusive control of the 
power to criminalize and punish, and only by respecting such con-
straints can the State maintain the legitimacy of its exclusive control.   
These three central aspects of criminal law not only establish the 
proportionality-based limitation as an important restriction on the 
State’s power to punish, but they also suggest that that limitation should 
take the form of a constitutional right that is resistant to tradeoffs.  The 
harm prevention and displacement functions of criminal law demon-
 
14 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE:  BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE 
LAW ON TRIAL 18 (1988) (“A legal system is possible only if the state enjoys a monopoly of 
force.  When private individuals appeal to force and decide who shall enjoy the right to 
‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,’ there can be no pretense of the rule of law.”). 
15 Cf. Joel Feinberg, Some Unswept Debris from the Hart-Devlin Debate, 72 SYNTHESE 249, 
254-57 (1987) (“[I]t is surely unfair that a less blameworthy violation of a statute should 
be morally condemned more severely than a more blameworthy one.  Fairness requires 
that relevantly dissimilar cases should be treated in appropriately dissimilar ways.”). 
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strate how the power to punish can be abused.  Punitive passions, while 
frequently and correctly based on the belief that a moral wrong has oc-
curred, can be excessive and driven by other less desirable sentiments 
such as cruelty, sadism, inhumanity, and racial hatred or prejudice.16  
Such sentiments may drive punishments well beyond what offenders 
deserve.  In addition, the pressures the State faces to reduce crime 
could lead it to use excessive and unwarranted violence.17   
Therefore, as the exclusive agent of punishment, the government 
has dual commitments.  On the one hand, because citizens are gener-
ally prohibited from defending themselves with violence or retaliating 
against wrongdoers,18 the government has an obligation to provide 
physical security to its citizens and respond adequately to any wrong-
doing.  On the other hand, the government cannot preserve its legiti-
macy as the sole rightful holder of the power to punish unless it 
respects the restrictions on its use of force, including proportionality.   
These two commitments can pull the government in different di-
rections.  The State can sometimes provide physical security more effi-
ciently and effectively by ignoring various substantive and procedural 
safeguards placed on its power.  But if the State starts to abuse its power 
in this way, its status as the legitimate holder of the power to criminalize 
and punish will be threatened.19  Yet there will be times when respecting 
these safeguards may seem downright irresponsible—a dereliction of 
duty—because the safeguards may get in the way of convicting and 
punishing wrongdoers.20  This reality means that unless we treat the 
constraints against disproportionate punishment as near inviolable, 
proportionality-based restrictions on punishment will yield too often 
and will not meaningfully limit the government’s power to punish. 
 
16 Cf. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 45-49 (Keith Ansell-
Pearson ed., Carol Diethe trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1887) (examining 
moral prejudices and their sources). 
17 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 252-
53 (2011) (discussing the “political backlash” that led to increased incarceration rates 
in the mid-to-late twentieth century). 
18 See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 
U. PITT. L. REV. 553, 556-58 (1996). 
19 See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 17, at 285-86 (discussing “the crisis of legitimacy that 
the criminal justice system faces” due to the disproportionate number of black men 
imprisoned in America). 
20 For a provocative articulation of this perspective, see Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian 
Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?  Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 
58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 750 (2005). 
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II.  PROPORTIONALITY IN THE SUPREME COURT 
How well are the justifications for proportionality presented in Part 
I reflected in our constitutional jurisprudence?  In order to answer this 
question, we first have to be clear on various analytic devices the Su-
preme Court employs in its proportionality analysis.  The Court uses at 
least four different tests.  
First, sometimes the nature of the Court’s proportionality analysis 
is essentially comparative.  The questions are not whether, say, robbery 
is a serious crime, but whether it is as serious as other crimes,21 and not 
whether a mentally retarded killer is culpable, but whether he is as 
culpable as an adult of normal intelligence who kills on purpose.22  I 
will refer to the analysis the Court applies here as “relative culpability.” 
Second, the Court has also understood proportionality in 
noncomparative terms.  As the Graham Court explained, proportionality 
calls for courts to compare “the gravity of the offense and the severity 
of the sentence.”23  This kind of proportionality analysis, which I will 
call the “absolute culpability” test, is about matching.  It requires the 
court to take a particular crime and a particular punishment and set 
them against each other, without regard to how other crimes are pun-
ished.  The absolute and relative culpability tests are closely related, 
and I will refer to them collectively as the “culpability test.”  
The third kind of proportionality analysis, which I will call the 
“pointless suffering” test, asks whether the punishment advances one 
of the goals of punishment or whether it is “nothing more than the 
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.”24  Accord-
ing to the Graham Court, “[a] sentence lacking any legitimate penolog-
ical justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.”25  
Under this test, if the punishment does not advance a legitimate pur-
pose, then it is not proportionate.   
 
21 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797-98, 801 (1982) (finding an individual’s 
blameworthiness for committing robbery less than that of committing more heinous 
crimes, such as murder, and so concluding that the death penalty is inappropriate for 
convicted robbers). 
22 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317-21 (2002) (holding that mentally retarded 
individuals are less culpable for their actions as compared to adults of normal intelli-
gence and thus cannot be sentenced to death). 
23 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010). 
24 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
25 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028. 
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Fourth and finally, there is the proportionality analysis advanced 
by the Court in Ewing v. California.26  Under this test, which I will call 
the “disjunctive test,” the Court asks whether the punishment advances 
one of the traditional goals of punishment.27  The Ewing Court wrote, 
“A sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, 
deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.”28  And according to the 
Court, for a punishment to pass constitutional muster, “it is enough 
that the [State] has a reasonable basis for believing” that its punish-
ment “advance[s] the goals of [its] criminal justice system in any sub-
stantial way.”29 
The third and fourth proportionality analyses are closely related, 
but different.  The “pointless suffering” test reflects the idea that pun-
ishment should not be imposed unless it advances some objective.  That 
is, it states a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a punishment 
to survive a constitutional challenge.  The disjunctive test from Ewing, 
by contrast, states a sufficient condition for constitutionality:  as long 
as a punishment advances some objective, it is constitutional. 
A.  The Relative Culpability Test 
As a theoretical matter, the relative culpability test is important for 
proportionality because what one wrongdoer deserves is sometimes 
determined by reference to what other wrongdoers deserve.  When the 
State punishes, the relation of one person’s punishment for a crime to 
punishments for other crimes supplies a reference point against which 
to judge how wrong society believes the behavior to be.  A punishment 
would be “undeserved” if it is more severe than the punishment im-
posed on those who have committed more—or equally—serious 
crimes because the judgment the punishment expresses about the se-
riousness of the criminal’s behavior would be inappropriate.30 
 
26 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
27 See id. at 25. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 28 (alterations in original) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 297 n.22 
(1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
30 See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 9, at 118 (arguing that “the degree of disapproval 
expressed by the punishment should ‘fit’ the crime . . . in the . . . sense that the more 
serious crimes should receive stronger disapproval than the less serious ones”); ANDREW 
VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 15-16 (1993) (“By punishing one kind of conduct 
more severely than another, the punisher conveys the message that it is worse—which is 
appropriate only if the conduct is indeed worse (i.e. more serious).  Were penalties or-
dered in severity inconsistently with the comparative seriousness of crime, the less rep-
rehensible conduct would, undeservedly, receive the greater reprobation.”). 
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For example, the death penalty carries a social meaning as the ul-
timate punishment reserved for only the most serious crimes.  Thus, 
each time the State imposes a death sentence, it sends the message that 
it considers the crime to be not only among the most serious offenses, 
but also equally serious to other crimes that society has labeled—and 
punished—as the most serious.  Those who commit less serious of-
fenses and are still sentenced to death would be receiving harsher sen-
tences than they deserve, because to receive the punishment they 
deserve they must be punished less harshly than the worst criminal.31 
The Court thus rightly places much importance on the relative 
culpability test in its proportionality jurisprudence.  The Court has 
created a number of categorical exemptions from death sentences for 
certain crimes and groups of criminals.  A criminal cannot constitu-
tionally be sentenced to death for the crime of rape,32 even if the vic-
tim is a child.33  It is also unconstitutional to punish by death someone 
who does not kill or intend to kill, but who is convicted under a felony-
murder statute for aiding and abetting a murder,34 unless the person 
showed “reckless indifference to human life.”35  A person cannot be 
sentenced to death if he is mentally retarded,36 or for a crime committed 
before the age of eighteen.37  Nor can a person be sentenced to life in 
prison without parole for a nonhomicide crime committed before the 
age of eighteen.38   
 
31 Relative culpability is not the same as equality.  Equality has generally come to 
mean equal treatment for similarly situated individuals.  Relative culpability, by con-
trast, requires this and more:  “like cases [should] be treated alike . . . [and] unlike 
cases [should] be treated in an appropriately unlike way.”  Thomas Hurka, Desert:  Indi-
vidualistic and Holistic, in DESERT AND JUSTICE 45, 54 (Serena Olsaretti ed., 2003).  Dif-
ferential treatment is thus fundamental to relative culpability.  
32 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
33 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008). 
34 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982). 
35 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).  Tison held that the death penalty was 
appropriate in a felony-murder case in which the defendant did not kill, but was a sub-
stantial participant in the felony and demonstrated reckless disregard for human life.  
Tison is a controversial case and is in tension with the principle of proportionality and 
the Court’s recent proportionality jurisprudence. See generally Joseph Trigilio & Tracy 
Casadio, Executing Those Who Do Not Kill:  A Categorical Approach to Proportional Sentencing, 
48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1371 (2011) (arguing that the Court’s movement toward propor-
tionality in the cases of Atkins v. Georgia, Roper v. Simmons, and Kennedy v. Louisiana gives 
cause to revisit the holding in Tison). 
36 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
37 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).  
38 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
Lee FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  5/5/2012 12:53 AM 
2012] Why Proportionality Matters 1843 
The logic driving these cases—and the relative culpability test in 
general—can be summed up in one sentence:  X is bad, but not as bad 
as Y.39  For instance, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, which held that a sentence 
of death is a grossly disproportionate punishment for the rape of a 
child, the Court reasoned that “there is a distinction between inten-
tional first-degree murder on the one hand and nonhomicide crimes 
against individual persons, even including child rape, on the other.”40  
While acknowledging that the “latter crimes may be devastating in 
their harm,” the Court concluded that “‘in terms of moral depravity 
and of the injury to the person and to the public,’ they cannot be 
compared to murder in their ‘severity and irrevocability.’”41  In Gra-
ham, too, the Court explained that “when compared to an adult mur-
derer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice 
diminished moral culpability.”42  That is, “defendants who do not kill, 
intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less de-
serving of the most serious forms of punishment than are murderers.”43  
Moreover, the Court noted that “juveniles have lessened culpability” 
and are “less deserving of the most severe punishments.”44 
B.  The Absolute Culpability Test 
The importance of the absolute culpability factor for proportionality 
is obvious:  that it would be disproportionate to punish a parking viola-
tion with a year in prison would be true even if every parking violation 
were treated equally and more serious crimes were treated more 
harshly.45  However, it is unclear how the absolute culpability test, 
which calls for matching “the gravity of the offense and the severity of 
the sentence,”46 is to be applied.  A ten dollar fine for murder is obvi-
 
39 For a more detailed discussion of such a comparison of culpability, see Youngjae 
Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 721-25 (2005). 
40 554 U.S. 407, 438 (2008). 
41 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plu-
rality opinion)). 
42 130 S. Ct. at 2027. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 2026. 
45 See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, 83 PHIL. REV. 297, 311 (1974) (“If 
beheading and disembowelment became the standard punishment for overtime park-
ing, . . . the penalty as applied in a given case would be unjust . . . even though it were 
applied uniformly and without discrimination to all offenders.  Moreover, it would be 
unjust even if it were the mildest penalty in the whole system of criminal law, with more 
serious offenses punished with proportionately greater severity still . . . .”). 
46 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022. 
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ously too lenient, and five years in jail for jaywalking is clearly too 
harsh.  Beyond such extreme cases, however, absolute culpability judg-
ments seem contestable.  The problem is that crime and punishment 
are incommensurable.  That is, the two scales, one crime and the other 
punishment, seem to have little to do with one another.  The crime 
scale cannot be translated into the punishment scale, nor vice versa, in 
the way a scale of inches can be translated into a scale of centimeters.  
As a result of this incommensurability, crime and punishment are in-
comparable, which creates a problem for the notion of equivalence 
between the two.47  These concerns led H.L.A. Hart to call the idea of 
proportionality “the most perplexing feature” of retributivism,48 while 
Oliver Wendell Holmes described it as “mystic.”49 
While, perhaps for these reasons, the absolute culpability test has 
not played a prominent role in the Supreme Court’s proportionality 
jurisprudence, the Court has at times relied on the idea.  For example, 
despite the sharpness of disagreement among some Justices in this area, 
it appears that one proposition has commanded broad, if not unani-
mous, support:  life imprisonment for parking violations would be an 
excessive punishment and thus unconstitutional.50  But the Court has 
also recently made statements that come close to making a commit-
ment to other, less obvious propositions about absolute culpability.  
For instance, in Kennedy, the Court acknowledged its “hesitation” to 
allow the death penalty in situations “where no life was taken in the 
commission of the crime.” 51  The Court indicated in Kennedy that there 
would be an incongruity between crime and punishment if the State 
took a life for a crime that did not itself take a life, suggesting an “eye 
 
47 For a useful discussion of the distinction between “incommensurability” and “in-
comparability,” see Ruth Chang, Introduction to INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, 
AND PRACTICAL REASON 1, 1-2 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).   
48 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY:  ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 233 (1968).  
49 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 37 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 
Belknap Press 1963) (1881).  
50 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1018 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (“[I]t 
[would not] be unreasonable to conclude that it would be both cruel and unusual to 
punish overtime parking by life imprisonment.”); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288 
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (asserting that levying a life sentence for a parking viola-
tion would “offend our felt sense of justice”); cf. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 986 n.11 (opinion 
of Scalia, J.) (noting that life imprisonment for a parking violation would be “horrible,” 
but that such a punishment would be unlikely to ever occur); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 
n.11 (acknowledging that proportionality comes into play with such an “extreme ex-
ample” as life imprisonment for overtime parking).  
51 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 435 (2008). 
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for an eye” type correspondence.52  In Graham, the Court stressed that 
“[l]ife without parole is an especially harsh punishment for a juve-
nile,”53 as it “deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without 
giving hope of restoration,”54 and also fails to account for the fact that 
“a juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a greater 
percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.”55  Again, the 
Court here appears to emphasize that the punishment of life without 
parole does not properly “match” offenses committed by juvenile of-
fenders.   
C.  The Pointless Suffering Test 
The pointless suffering test asks whether the punishment in ques-
tion advances a traditional penological goal or is “nothing more than 
the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.”56  As a 
matter of proportionality, the pointless suffering test is redundant.  To 
demonstrate that a punishment results in pointless suffering, one must 
first show that the punishment is disproportionate from the just de-
serts perspective.  But once that finding has been reached, there is no 
reason to ask whether other purposes of punishment are being ad-
vanced.  The punishment is problematic even without any such demon-
stration.   
The pointless suffering test is not necessary as a doctrinal matter 
either, as illustrated by Coker v. Georgia.  In Coker, the Court held that 
imposing the death penalty for rape is unconstitutional, and, after 
mentioning the culpability test and the pointless suffering test, stated 
that a “punishment might fail the test on either ground.”57  The Court 
explained in a footnote, “Because the death sentence is a dispropor-
 
52 The Biblical maxim of lex talionis (commonly known as “an eye for an eye”) 
reads, “If any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, 
hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.”  Exodus 
21:23-25 (New Revised Standard); see also MARVIN HENBERG, RETRIBUTION:  EVIL FOR 
EVIL IN ETHICS, LAW, AND LITERATURE 68-74 (1990) (discussing various versions of lex 
talionis in the Bible).  Even though the maxim sounds cruel to the modern reader, lex 
talionis was a limiting principle in its historical context.  As Igor Primoratz has ex-
plained, the principle served to “restrain[] the vengefulness of the wronged” by com-
manding “for one life, take one, not ten lives; for one eye, take one, not both.”  IGOR 
PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 87 (1989). 
53 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010). 
54 Id. at 2027. 
55 Id. at 2028. 
56 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
57 Id. (emphasis added). 
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tionate punishment for rape, it is cruel and unusual punishment within 
the meaning of the Eighth Amendment even though it may measurably 
serve the legitimate ends of punishment and therefore is not invalid for its fail-
ure to do so.”58  The Court, in reaching this conclusion, relied exclusively 
on the culpability test and paid no heed to the pointless suffering 
test.59  Interestingly, in its Kennedy decision, the Court repeated the 
language that a “punishment might fail the test on either ground,”60 
after it had been absent from majority opinions for three decades, al-
though the Court did not rely on or explain the statement. 
Moreover, when one applies the Coker Court’s formulation that a 
punishment may be unconstitutional under either the culpability test 
or the pointless suffering test, it becomes evident that the latter test is 
not only unnecessary but also redundant.  The Court considers retri-
bution to be a legitimate goal of punishment, and its assessment of the 
culpability of the relevant class of offenders has not differed in any way 
from its assessment of whether the punishment can be justified on re-
tributivist grounds.61  Thus, if a punishment fails the pointless suffering 
test, then it must a fortiori fail the culpability test.  In other words, a 
punishment may be unconstitutional either for failing the culpability 
test or the pointless suffering test, but a showing of the latter necessarily 
includes a showing of the former.  Therefore, a punishment’s failure 
to pass the culpability test is both necessary and sufficient for it to be 
unconstitutionally disproportionate, and the pointless suffering test is 
mere surplusage.    
Although the Court has not acknowledged the pointlessness of the 
pointless suffering test, it has, as a matter of practice, made it redun-
dant.  Whenever the Court determines that a punishment is unconsti-
tutional for failing the relative culpability test (that is, X is bad, but not 
as bad as Y), it also tends to conclude that the punishment in question 
fails the pointless suffering test.  For example, the Roper Court, in de-
claring the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional, concluded that 
“neither retribution nor deterrence provides adequate justification for 
 
58 Id. at 592 n.4 (emphasis added). 
59 The extent to which the Court paid attention to the deterrence question appears 
to be confined to the following single sentence in a footnote, implying an extremely 
demanding version of the purposes of punishment test:  “We observe that . . . it would 
be difficult to support a claim that the death penalty for rape is an indispensable part 
of the States’ criminal justice system.”  Id.  
60 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441 (2008) (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 592) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
61 See Lee, supra note 39, at 690. 
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imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders.”62  The Atkins Court, 
holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional when imposed on 
mentally retarded offenders, stated that it was “not persuaded that the 
execution of mentally retarded criminals will measurably advance the 
deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty.”63  The Ken-
nedy Court, too, found that the death penalty for child rape “would not 
further retributive purposes”64 and “may not result in more deterrence 
or more effective enforcement.”65   
Of course, there is nothing wrong with the idea that punishments 
that serve no purpose should not be allowed.  Instead, the problem 
with the pointless suffering test is that it is unclear what it adds to the 
analysis, yet it gives the impression that for a punishment to be uncon-
stitutional, it must not advance any of the traditional goals of punish-
ment.  This impression is misleading, because, under Coker, a punish-
ment may be found unconstitutional for failing either the culpability 
test or the pointless suffering test.  Further, the impression that a pun-
ishment must not advance any penological purpose to be excessive 
creates confusion between the pointless suffering test and the disjunc-
tive test. 
D.  The Disjunctive Test 
Under the disjunctive test, as long as a punishment advances one of 
the objectives of punishment, it is constitutionally permitted.  As dis-
cussed above, providing physical security may sometimes be done 
more efficiently and effectively if the State can at times ignore propor-
tionality limitations.  Because of this strong temptation to punish ex-
cessively, it is important to implement proportionality limitations as 
rights.  The right against excessive punishment should therefore have 
the following form:  even if doing X to A would advance an overall 
purpose of punishment, it should not be done because doing X to A 
would be disproportionate.  This structure is nonsensical from the 
perspective of the disjunctive theory because that theory terminates 
the analysis if a legitimate end of punishment is served.  In our crimi-
nal justice system, we pursue various goals,66 but the pursuit takes place 
 
62 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005). 
63 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
64 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 442 (2008). 
65 Id. at 445. 
66 See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. 
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under a set of fairness constraints.67  The disjunctive theory allows the 
delicate relationship between goals and constraints to be disturbed by 
dissolving the constraints and permitting the goals to dominate un-
checked.  This is a reason to reject the disjunctive theory.  
As a doctrinal matter, the disjunctive theory is a relatively recent 
invention.  The origin of the disjunctive theory can be found in Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan.68  Harmelin 
held that a sentence of a mandatory term of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole for possession of 672 grams of cocaine was not 
cruel and unusual.69  In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy stated that 
one of the principles governing the Court’s inquiry into proportionality 
is that “the Eighth Amendment does not mandate adoption of any one 
penological theory,” as “[t]he federal and state criminal systems have 
accorded different weights at different times to the penological goals 
of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.”70  This 
statement is uncontroversially true.   
However, there is a difference between the principle that the Con-
stitution does not mandate the legislature to adopt any one penological 
theory in determining how to set appropriate sentences, and the principle 
that the Constitution does not mandate the judiciary to adopt any one 
penological theory in determining how to set limits on sentences devised by 
legislatures.  The two ideas should not be equated, but that is precisely 
what the Court did in Ewing v. California, in which it held that a prison 
term of twenty-five years to life under California’s three-strikes law was 
not excessive for the crime of stealing three golf clubs by a repeat of-
fender.71  
After citing Harmelin for the proposition that retribution, deter-
rence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation are all legitimate purposes of 
punishment, the plurality in Ewing stated that “[s]ome or all of these 
justifications may play a role in a State’s sentencing scheme” and that 
“[s]electing the sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice to be 
made by state legislatures, not federal courts.”72  The plurality then 
 
67 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
68 See 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
69 Id. at 961, 994-96 (opinion of Scalia, J.).  No opinion in Harmelin gained a major-
ity, and the opinion that eventually came to assume the status of law is Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter. 
70 Id. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
71 538 U.S. 11, 17-18, 30-31 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
72 Id. at 25. 
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noted that “[r]ecidivism has long been recognized as a legitimate basis 
for increased punishment” and that California has an interest in inca-
pacitating repeat offenders and deterring crimes.73  The plurality con-
cluded by articulating the disjunctive theory:  “It is enough that the 
State . . . has a reasonable basis for believing that [the punish-
ment] . . . ‘advance[s] the goals of [its] criminal justice system in any 
substantial way.’”74 
So, it appears that to the extent the Supreme Court subscribes to 
the disjunctive test, it is committed to an incorrect theory of propor-
tionality.  Fortunately, there have been signs recently that the Court 
realizes that it took a wrong step in Ewing.  For example, as mentioned 
above, the Court noted in Kennedy that “[a] punishment might fail the 
test on either” the culpability test or the pointless suffering test, which 
directly contradicts the disjunctive test.75   
More significantly, the Court went a step further while discussing 
the deterrence rationale in Graham.  After making the usual comment 
about the immaturity of juveniles, the Court added that “[e]ven if the 
punishment has some connection to a valid penological goal, it must 
be shown that the punishment is not grossly disproportionate in light 
of the justification offered.”76  The Court concluded that “in light of 
juvenile nonhomicide offenders’ diminished moral responsibility, any 
limited deterrent effect provided by life without parole is not enough 
to justify the sentence,” even though it is “perhaps plausible” that “the 
sentence deters in a few cases.”77  Similarly, in discussing the incapaci-
tation rationale, the Court noted that “[i]ncapacitation cannot override 
all other considerations, lest the Eighth Amendment’s rule against dis-
proportionate sentences be a nullity.”78  
These statements suggest that potential incapacitation or deter-
rence effects will not be reason enough to uphold certain punish-
ments, which may mean that the era of the disjunctive theory is over.  
Along these lines, it is important to note that the Court made these 
statements after it declined to apply the Ewing framework.  Ewing was 
the first case to clearly articulate the disjunctive test and also arguably 
 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 28 (fourth and fifth alterations in original) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 
U.S. 277, 297 n.22 (1983)). 
75 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441 (2008) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion)). 
76 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
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the case most on point for Graham because it too involved noncapital 
excessiveness.   
Before Graham, the Supreme Court’s proportionality jurispru-
dence under the Eighth Amendment proceeded along two tracks—
capital and noncapital—where the Court applied different tests, lead-
ing to different outcomes, depending on the track.79  Graham’s ruling 
changed this framework.80  The Graham Court, considering a challenge 
to a prison sentence, announced that “the appropriate analysis” was 
not the one used in Harmelin and Ewing, both of which dealt with prison 
sentences, but the one used in Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy, all death 
penalty cases.81  After Graham, it seems that Ewing will no longer retain 
its status as the most important noncapital excessiveness case.  Ewing 
and its disjunctive test may go the way of Rummel v. Estelle, in which the 
Court unsuccessfully attempted in 1980 to foreclose, once and for all, 
defendants’ ability to challenge noncapital sentences on excessiveness 
 
79 See Lee, supra note 39, at 687-99 (tracking the development of case law for capital 
and noncapital cases and concluding that the “death is different” rationale does not 
account for the different approaches between the two types of cases); see also Rachel E. 
Barkow, The Court of Life and Death:  The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and 
the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1175-86 (2009) (analyzing alternate the-
ories to account for the difference between capital and noncapital cases, including 
administrative concerns). 
80 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 49, 49-50 
(2010) (stating that the Court in Graham for the first time applied its categorical pro-
portionality analysis for capital offenses to a noncapital crime); Richard S. Frase, Gra-
ham’s Good News—and Not, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 54, 54 (2010) (arguing that Graham 
“suggests a more unified approach to proportionality,” in contrast with the Court’s 
prior “two-track distinction between death and prison sentences”); Youngjae Lee, The 
Purposes of Punishment Test, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 58, 58 (2010) (explaining how Graham 
represents a departure from the Court’s prior two-track test); Eva S. Nilsen, From Har-
melin to Graham—Justice Kennedy Stakes Out a Path to Proportional Punishment, 23 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 67, 68 (2010) (suggesting that the Court finally saw similarities between 
death and life without parole, showing that “[d]eath [i]s [n]ot [t]otally [d]ifferent”); 
Alison Siegler & Barry Sullivan, “Death Is Different No Longer”:  Graham v. Florida and the 
Future of Eighth Amendment Challenges to Noncapital Sentences, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 327, 328-30 
(stating that Graham signaled the end of the capital versus noncapital distinction); Carol 
S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine In:  The Supreme Court Opens a 
Window Between Two Formerly Walled-Off Approaches to Eighth Amendment Proportionality 
Challenges, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 79, 81 (2010) (“Justice Kennedy thus managed to trans-
form what had looked like a capital versus noncapital line, the application of which ren-
dered noncapital challenges essentially hopeless, into a categorical rule versus individual 
sentence line, in which individuals asserting proportionality challenges based on special 
group circumstances (such as reduced moral culpability) could avoid the threshold 
chopping block that had previously doomed noncapital proportionality challenges.”).  
81 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023. 
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grounds.82  In short, it seems that the Supreme Court in Graham has 
come closer than ever to the theory of proportionality outlined in Part 
I of this Article. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that there is a good reason, grounded in a 
broad political theory concerning the role of criminal law and the State, 
to consider that the “concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth 
Amendment”83 and that it is the “precept of justice that punishment for 
crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.”84  This 
Article has further contended that this theoretical perspective is reflect-
ed—albeit unevenly and imperfectly—in the Supreme Court’s propor-
tionality jurisprudence. 
Of course, many questions remain.  Proportionality, even if under-
stood correctly, remains a vague idea.  Not only is it vague, but the 
questions of who deserves what and which crimes are more deserving 
and which less deserving of punishment are highly contestable issues.85  
The vagueness and contestability of proportionality strengthen the 
separation-of-powers norms that determinations of specific prison 
terms for crimes traditionally have been and should be “properly with-
in the province of legislatures, not courts” and that courts should gen-
erally defer to legislatures in this realm.86  In the end, the limited role 
of the judiciary should be kept in mind when shaping the doctrine and 
adjusting the level of deference given to legislatures at the implemen-
tation stage.87 
 
82 See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1980) (explaining that the Court was 
reluctant to review terms of imprisonment that were legislatively mandated because of 
separation of powers concerns).  While Rummel continues to be cited as good law, its 
holding is impossible to reconcile with the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence.  See Lee, 
supra note 39, at 730 n.246. 
83 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021. 
84 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 
(1910)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
85 See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, Keeping Desert Honest (arguing that incapacitation and de-
terrence “need to be constrained” by principles of desert), in CRIMINAL LAW CONVER-
SATIONS 49, 51 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009); Alice Ristroph, The New Desert 
(stating that desert is an “elastic” concept that can change as reforms in the criminal 
justice system are made), in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra, 45, 49. 
86 See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275-76. 
87 I have made some suggestions along these lines elsewhere.  See generally Youngjae 
Lee, Judicial Regulation of Excessive Punishments Through the Eighth Amendment, 18 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 234, 234 (2006) (discussing how the Court can protect Eighth Amendment 
rights while maintaining deference to the legislature).  
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The starting point in this endeavor, however, should be to end the 
Atkins-Roper-Kennedy impression that enforcing the Eighth Amendment 
is appropriate only when it is costless to law enforcement.  Being serious 
about enforcing the Eighth Amendment requires giving up some of the 
deterrence and incapacitation benefits of punishment in certain in-
stances.  That rights must be enforced despite their accompanying costs 
is a familiar notion in constitutional law.  As Justice Alito reminded us 
recently, “[a]ll of the constitutional provisions that impose restrictions 
on law enforcement and on the prosecution of crimes” have “controver-
sial public safety implications.”88  In other words, the Eighth Amend-
ment right against excessive punishment should be treated like any 
other right, and there is a good political philosophical reason for doing 
so. 
 
88 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3045 (2010). 
